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Abstract: 
This study examined the causal link between the job ownership structure and increased 
commitment and motivation in worker co-operatives. The separation of job ownership 
from management and the effective alignment of the interests of job managers and the 
owners have generated a lot of discussion in the past. Proponents of the agency theory 
have, on the one hand, recommend actions that maximize shareholders value. On the 
other hand, the adoption of sweeping statements of purpose by many business 
organizations, have led to the recommendation of the stakeholder and the stewardship 
theories as being the appropriate guides to corporate actions. However, given the 
complexities of modern business organizations where the expectations of the workers 
and job owners are increasingly getting blurred, reliance on these theories does not 
provide a satisfactory solution. Survey questionnaires were the main instrument for 
primary data collection in this study. Semi-structured follow-up interviews were also 
conducted to supplement the method. The research design included three phases of 
data collection and analysis. Phase one was a qualitative method of informal, semi-
structured interviews while phase two was a quantitative survey, the findings of which 
were used to construct further semi-structured follow-up interviews with worker co-
operative stakeholders. The study concluded that the job ownership structure adopted 
by worker co-operatives has resulted into increased commitment and motivation which 
has in turn lead to increased productivity and improved performance. 
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1. Introduction  
 
It has been argued that when employees invest firm-specific human capital in the firm, 
their contribution is just as important as, or even more important than, the 
shareholders' investment of finance capital and thus recognition should be given to 
employee property rights in the firm equivalent to that of shareholders (Wanjiru, 2004). 
The concept of employee ownership signifies that workers, just like shareholders, can 
have a claim on the firm's resources which is protected by property rules. According to 
Deakin and Slinger, as quoted by Wanjiru (2004), the employees’ proprietary interest in 
a firm is normally acquired when they contribute firm-specific human capital which 
refers to the time, skill and knowledge invested by employees in the firm. It is 
rationalized by the shareholder primacy norm that it is the shareholders who bear the 
residual risk and that shareholders’ return is realized only after the firm’s other 
liabilities (to workers and creditors) are satisfied, hence the firm is not bound to owe 
any obligations towards them (Wanjiru, 2004). This study, however, examines an 
alternative job ownership model in which employees can also bear the residual risk in 
addition to investing time and effort into acquiring the skills needed in their jobs. 
 A standard worker co-operatives model results into business entities that are 
owned and controlled by their members, the people who work in them. In a worker co-
operative, ownership and control of the business derive from working in the company, 
rather than from simply investing capital in it. A central element of the business 
structure is that labour should hire capital rather than that capital should hire labour 
(Cockerton et al., 1980). A worker co-operative model of enterprise is therefore one form 
of job ownership structure that prohibits non-workers from holding membership voting 
shares, thus retaining control of the firm within the workforce. Profits and losses from 
the business are allocated to worker-owners according to either the hours worked or 
gross pay. Skill and seniority determine wage rates, which are often set by an equitable 
ratio between the highest and lowest paid worker-owners (Cockerton et al., 1980; 
Hansen et al, 1997). The central characteristics of worker co-operatives include the fact 
that workers invest in and own the business and that decision-making is democratic, 
generally adhering to the principle of one worker-one vote. That is, workers combine 
their skills, experience and financial resources to achieve mutual goals.  
 The worker co-operative model for business enterprise assures any group of 
individuals an effective means to combine their resources, however small. It permits a 
larger resource mobilization than that within the capacity of most individuals and small 
enterprises. As direct beneficiaries, worker co-operative members have a strong 
incentive for efficient operation and continuous innovation in response to changing 
business environments achieving thereby high rates of both initial success and long 
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term viability. This model favours the long term development of an enterprise 
compatible with the interests of the communities in which it operates. The stability it 
assures within local communities itself induces further entrepreneurial expansion 
(United Nations, 1996). 
 Most enterprises have adopted governance principles that have evolved and 
reflect what was considered as the best practice in the UK and USA. In line with the 
underlying assumptions of the agency theory, these principles primarily focused on 
enhancing shareholder value and, in the process, richly rewarded top executives and 
have been the principal basis for governance codes around the world. Similarly, the 
stakeholder view of corporate governance, is often associated with Japanese and 
continental European practice ( mainly Germany ) where law has required that half the 
seats on supervisory boards go to representatives of the workforce and where custom 
has long mandated that a company's bankers and large-block shareholders have seats 
on the board. 
 The stewardship theory, on the other hand, suggests that management and 
board members in an organization will be motivated by some larger force than the 
desire for personal wealth. Drawing on organizational psychology, it suggests that self-
esteem and fulfillment loom large in their decision-making, as had suggested in 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Unlike the agency theory, the stewardship theory does 
not stress on the perspective of individualism, Donaldson & Davis (1991), but rather on 
the role of top management, as stewards, playing the role of integrating their goals with 
that of the organization. The stewardship perspective suggests that stewards are 
satisfied and motivated only when organizational success is attained. 
 Corporate governance practices employed by worker co-operatives are, however, 
guided by the co-operative principle of democratic control. Decisions as to how the 
business is run are made democratically by the co-operative system of one member - 
one vote and the workers collectively develop the policies that determine the co- 
operative's daily and long-term operation. By democratizing the workplace, individuals 
are able to participate in routine decision-making affecting their immediate work 
environment, an arena in which they have first-hand knowledge. Pateman (1970) 
argues that the effect of democratizing a workplace escalates beyond the factory gate as 
workers find that they can exercise greater control over their working lives, they seek to 
shape other aspects of their lives by participating in civic and political institutions. 
Moreover, the author notes that having learned to participate at work they will have 
acquired the confidence, skills and desire to participate in civic society. In short, 
workplace democracy will turn workers into responsible citizens (Pateman, 1970). 
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 The distinction between worker co-operatives and other forms of employee 
owned business initiatives, such as Employee Stock Ownership Programs (ESOPs), can 
be confusing. ESOPs have now become a common form of employee ownership in the 
United States, Canada, Europe and Japan. ESOPs allow the employees of a business to 
invest in that business. They often form so that the company can receive tax benefits 
and/or because of the belief that employees are more efficient if they have a vested 
interest in the business. Some companies in crisis also develop ESOPs. The workers’ 
investment, through buying shares in the company, helps pull the company through 
the crisis, thus securing the workers’ employment. ESOPs, like worker co-operatives, 
can also take many different forms. However, the main difference between an ESOP 
company and a worker co-operative is in democratic structure. A worker co-operative is 
governed on the principle of one member-one vote (Michie, Oughton, and Bennion, 
2002; Bradley & Gelb, 1983).   
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Job-ownership researchers (Postlethwaite, Michie, Burns, & Nuttall, 2005; Hansen et al, 
1997; Bibby, 2004) point out that worker co-operatives are unique both as co-operatives 
and as businesses. They provide the worker-members with employment and income 
along with the ownership and control of the enterprise. Through their ownership and 
control, the worker-members receive a fair share of the profits and enjoy workplace de-
mocracy. The difference between worker co-operatives and other types of co-operatives 
is the fact that members of worker co-operatives both own and work for their co-
operative. In contrast, members of a consumer co-operative own the store they shop at, 
but do not necessarily work at the store. In the best of all worlds, worker co-operatives 
can integrate members' economic activities to obtain efficiencies in ways that no other 
form of business can match (Valentinov, 2004; Fairbairn, 2003; Fukuyama, 1999). A 
study by Michie et al, (2002) concluded that employee involvement and participation in 
worker co-operatives does increase employee commitment and motivation. 
 Postlethwaite et al (2005) note that the employee and co-owned business sector in 
the UK has grown too big, too diverse and too effective to be ignored. They estimate the 
turnover of the co-owned sector as exceeding £20-25 billion. A research study by Michie 
et al (2002) indicates that the co-operative ownership structure motivates employees. 
People have a sense of ownership and are prepared to put in extra effort because they 
like the ethos of the organization. Collective ownership makes people feel they have an 
influence over big (strategic) questions. Ownership over the company’s values gives 
meaning to jobs. People take responsibility to make things happen (Postlethwaite et al, 
2005; Michie et al, 2002). 
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 Worker co-operatives are enterprises in which the workforce takes collective 
responsibility for the business which employs them, while enjoying fair reward from 
the profits which they create (Postlethwaite et al 2005; Hansen et al, 1997; Cockerton et 
al., 1980; Oakeshott, 1978). According to Hansen, Coontz and Malan (1997), worker co-
operative members are accepted according to criteria set by the co-operative, by 
working in the business, and through the purchase of a membership share. Each 
member of the worker co-operative becomes an owner with rights and obligations, 
including participating in workplace decisions, contributing labor and skills, and 
receiving an equitable share of profits.  
 Many writers (Postlethwaite et al 2005; Hansen et al, 1997; Cockerton et al., 1980; 
Oakeshott, 1978; Spear, 2002) admit that worker co-operatives embody the concepts of 
worker participation and ownership, people-centered economic development, social 
well-being and quality of life. They involve their member-workers at all the levels of 
risk-taking, management, operations and added-value distribution. A private company 
can also be turned into a worker co-operative if the owner wants to leave the business 
due to retirement, illness, etc. The employees buy shares from the owner and assume 
control of the business. This form of mutualisation often appeals to the former owners, 
as it allows them to become members and remain active in the company (Bradley & 
Gelb, 1983).  
 Postlethwaite et al (2005) contend that employee owned companies are now 
arguably setting the pace on at least one of the most prized yardsticks for 
competitiveness: the ability to harness the true commitment and creativity of their 
employees. Other enterprises have looked at the co-owned sector and concluded that 
the secret is simply employee share ownership, perhaps simply good communication, 
or clever participation systems. They have consequently tried to copy different aspects 
of the employee-ownership model (Postlethwaite et al, 2005). 
 Many writers (e.g. Bradley & Gelb, 1983; Hansen et al, 1997; Michie et al, 2002) 
argue that extensive employee stake-holding tends to foster a sense of individual 
enterprise that directly fuels productivity. Employees in co-owned companies tend to 
be relatively entrepreneurial because they are owners. They typically have a more 
creative attitude to their own work and the future of the business. They are more 
comfortable taking responsibility for decisions and accepting a lot of discretion about 
the way they carry out work tasks (Postlethwaite et al, 2005).  
 The relatively high levels of trust and consultation in co-owned companies also 
mean they tend to be highly innovative. Whereas change is often seen as a threat, not to 
mention a surprise, in other kinds of companies, co-owned companies routinely do the 
kind of communication and consultation that allows employees to see the purpose of 
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change and adapt to it successfully (Postlethwaite et al, 2005; Michie et al, 2002; Bradley 
& Gelb, 1983 ). 
 Also, the way employee owned companies are structured means they achieve 
high standards of accountability and corporate social responsibility. The employee co-
owners, as shareholders, tend to demand and impose relatively exacting levels of 
corporate transparency and integrity (Postlethwaite et al, 2005; Hansen et al, 1997; 
Michie et al, 2002). It has been argued further by Postlethwaite et al (2005) that aside 
from the employee-ownership ‘micro’ effects at the level of the individual companies, 
the society also benefits from having the additional, different and vibrant business 
paradigm. The employee owned business sector enriches the diversity of ownership 
models capable of operating successfully – widening choice for consumers, funders, job 
seekers, suppliers and purchasers. Studies by different researchers (Bradley & Gelb, 
1983; Hansen et al, 1997; Michie et al, 2002; Postlethwaite et al, 2005) conclude that many 
employee-owned companies out-perform those owned entirely by external 
shareholders and often demonstrate higher productivity, greater innovation, increased 
customer loyalty, and enhanced talent recruitment and retention. This is because 
successful employee ownership plans combine three key factors; financial incentives, 
employee involvement mechanisms and an ‘ownership culture’ to foster an 
environment where employees are motivated and empowered to act in the best 
interests of the organization.  
 Worker co-operatives also constitute a vital form of workplace democracy in a 
society where workers do not often have control over their work settings. Pateman 
(1970) argues that democratic control and participation in workplace decision-making 
can spill over into wider society by increasing the probability of participation in 
decision making beyond the workplace. The primary focus is on worker cooperatives 
because they are organizations owned and controlled by the workforce and in which 
participation is most extensive and regular and therefore have most impact on 
individual members. Individual attitudes and behaviour are shaped by the institutions 
within which they act. So, where individuals actively engage in democratic institutions 
they are more likely to develop the necessary attitudes, skills and psychological 
qualities that contribute to individual decision-making efficacy, which in turn will 
increase greater civic participation. Carter (2006) and Pateman (1970) are in agreement 
that most people spend a large part of their daily lives in the workplace, usually in 
authoritarian organisations where they exercise little influence over their work. The 
hierarchical, bureaucratic organisations in which they work give them little opportunity 
to hone their democratic skills.  
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 According to Carter (2006), many workers clearly do prize the co-operative 
experience. Mondragon workers display high levels of vertical trust between managers 
and workers, and high commitment, involvement and motivation. He adds that 
workers in American plywood co-ops and Israeli kibbutzim value participation. 
Similarly, in grass-root co-operatives in the US and the UK, members are strongly 
committed, involved and satisfied in their work (p. 418). Carter (2006) explains that 
participation and efficacy in decision-making may be undermined when a small elite 
exercises informal control and the majority of workers do not engage actively in 
decision-making or when positive expectations of the process of participation are not 
fulfilled. Indeed, many co-operatives experience a process of organizational 
degeneration whereby control becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few 
in which case the elected leaders become ruling elite (Carter, 2006).  
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
The research study utilized mainly the quantitative data collection and analysis 
methods. However, reasonable use of qualitative techniques was made in data 
collection to supplement the quantitative methods. The investigation therefore used 
methodological triangulation. In particular, it used the ‚between-methods triangulation‛ 
technique in which one method complements and / or supplements the other. 
Triangulation, in many cases, produces more valid and reliable results than the use of 
single methods. Reinharz (1992) confirms that triangulation increases ‚the likelihood of 
obtaining scientific credibility and research utility‛ (p. 197).  
 The data collection process began by first carrying out informal, open-ended 
interviews with officials of co-operative and job ownership organizations that are 
involved in promotion work and in research and development projects concerning 
worker co-operatives and other job ownership enterprises. The organizations selected 
for the informal interviews included the Co-operative-UK, the umbrella body for 
worker co-operatives, the Job Ownership Limited, the Industrial Common Ownership 
Movement, the Industrial Common Ownership Finance (Cambridge office) and the Co-
operative College. The officials interviewed included a chief executive, a national 
strategy coordinator, and project managers.  
 The objective of this phase was to collect relevant background information 
regarding the past, present and future opportunities and threats as well as strengths 
and weaknesses influencing the performance of worker co-operatives in Britain. Both 
personal (face-to-face) and telephone interviewing methods were employed in this 
phase. Notes were taken during the interviews and the information gathered formed a 
good background material for the construction of survey questionnaires in phase two. 
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Available literature and case studies on worker co-operatives including the failed co-
operative enterprises were also reviewed for relevant material for the survey 
questionnaires.  
 According to Co-operatives-UK, it was estimated that there were approximately 
390 worker owned and controlled co-operatives in Britain. Mail-survey questionnaires 
were therefore sent out to the entire population of worker co-operatives in Britain as 
maintained in the directory of their umbrella organization, the Co-operative –UK. In 
total, the entire 390 worker co-operatives were surveyed on various issues relating to 
the research hypothesis. A total of 142 responses were eventually obtained from the 390 
worker co-operatives surveyed. Eleven (11) of the responses were not very useful since 
the respondents were either dormant, under liquidation or had converted to non-co-
operative enterprises. The overall result was therefore a sample of 131 active worker co-
operatives out of a population of 379 active worker co-operatives. This is a response rate 
of 35%. The responses were from a wide spectrum of worker co-operatives in terms of 
the economic and social sectors represented. These sectors included consultancy and 
professional services, wholefoods, arts and the media, printing and publishing, care and 
support services, crafts and woodwork, leisure, and other retail services.  
 To test non-response bias, a sample comprising the first forty seven respondents 
was compared to the one of 47 respondents who submitted their questionnaires after 
the reminder. Chi-square tests (χ2) were used for the non-response bias. It is the 
contention of many writers (Bryman and Cramer, 2005; Kinnear and Gray, 2004; Field, 
2005; Sarantakos, 2003; Berg, 2002) that chi-square tests are the most popular and most 
frequently used tests of significance in the social sciences. Normally there are two types 
of chi-square tests, being the goodness-of-fit test and the test of independence. Tests of 
independence were used in this study for the non-response bias. The results of the tests 
are shown in Tables 1 – 3 below: 
 
Table 1: Chi-square Test for the Type of Business Activity 
 
Table 1 – 1: BusType * Group Crosstabulation 
  
Group 
Total 
 
EarlyRes 
LateRes 
BusType 
  
 
 
Consult 9 9 18 
Prnting 9 9 18 
HlthFood 8 3 11 
Arts 4 6 10 
HlthLeisr 5 2 7 
Joshua Wanjare 
LEVERAGING THE JOB OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE BY WORKER CO-OPERATIVES
 
European Journal of Economic and Financial Research - Volume 2 │ Issue 2 │ 2017                                                       128 
CareSppt 1 4 5 
MiscRtl 5 2 7 
Others 6 12 18 
 
Total 47 47 94 
 
Table 1 - 2: Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.044(a) 7 .250 
Likelihood Ratio 9.384 7 .226 
Linear-by-Linear Association .841 1 .359 
N of Valid Cases 94 
  
 
Table 2: Chi-square Test for the Number of Members 
 
Table 2 - 1: NumMbrs * Group Crosstabulation 
 
Group 
Total 
 
EarlyRes 
LateRes 
 
NumMbrs 
    
0 - 7 9 5 14 
7 -10 20 29 49 
 
Over 10 18 13 31 
Total 47 47 94 
 
Table 2 – 2: Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.203(b) 1 .273 
  
Continuity Correction(a) .770 1 .380 
  
Likelihood Ratio 1.207 1 .272 
  
Fisher's Exact Test     
 
.380 .190 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.190 1 .275 
  
 
Table 3: Chi-square Test for the Level of Performance Satisfaction 
 
Table 3 – 1: Satisfd * Group Crosstabulation 
  
Group 
Total 
 
EarlyRes 
LateRes 
 
Satisfd 
    
satisfd 22 17 39 
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Somewhat 17 18 35 
Not 8 12 20 
 
Total 47 47 94 
 
Table 3 – 2: Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.470(a) 2 .480 
Likelihood Ratio 1.477 2 .478 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.453 1 .228 
N of Valid Cases 94 
  
 
All the results in tables 1 – 3 show that the value of the chi-square is not significant (p > 
.05). Therefore, there are no significant differences between the early and the late 
responses as regards the five variables listed above. It is therefore reasonable to assert 
that the characteristics of those who responded before the reminder and those who 
responded after the reminder are not different. 
 Reliability of the questionnaire was tested using the Cronbach’s alpha, which is the 
most commonly used measure of questionnaire reliability (Field, 2005; Moser and 
Kalton, 1989; Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Only the variables relating to the co-operative 
environment and the internal environment were tested for their internal reliability. The 
results are shown in table 4 and table 5 below. 
 
Table 4: Reliability Analysis of the Co-operative Environment Variables 
 
Table 4 – 1: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items 
.846 .846 7 
 
Table 4 – 2: Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
  Princpls MbCommit Commnity FairTrad Communty Prncples FairTrde 
Princpls 1.000 .389 .481 .504 .404 .527 .438 
MbCommit .389 1.000 .306 .369 .216 .479 .330 
Commnity .481 .306 1.000 .539 .537 .458 .553 
FairTrad .504 .369 .539 1.000 .694 .491 .467 
Communty .404 .216 .537 .694 1.000 .390 .358 
Prncples .527 .479 .458 .491 .390 1.000 .314 
FairTrde .438 .330 .553 .467 .358 .314 1.000 
 
The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis. 
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Table 4 – 3: Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean  
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance  
if Item  
Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total  
Correlation 
Squared  
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha  
if Item  
Deleted 
Princpls 10.08 12.062 .629 .412 .820 
MbCommit 10.15 12.992 .463 .289 .845 
Commnity 9.99 12.069 .665 .487 .815 
FairTrad 10.17 11.895 .715 .594 .808 
Communty 10.05 12.306 .589 .527 .826 
Prncples 9.96 12.299 .607 .429 .824 
FairTrde 10.08 12.431 .556 .381 .831 
 
Table 5: Reliability Analysis of the Internal Environment Variables 
 
Table 5 – 1: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items 
.822 .823 7 
 
Table 5 – 2: Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
  Fnancial Physcal Skills Mgt Training DecsnMkg CoopMgt 
Fnancial 1.000 .794 .551 .112 .418 .125 .099 
Physcal .794 1.000 .576 .051 .404 .105 .077 
Skills .551 .576 1.000 .222 .727 .310 .256 
Mgt .112 .051 .222 1.000 .437 .744 .661 
Training .418 .404 .727 .437 1.000 .437 .423 
DecsnMkg .125 .105 .310 .744 .437 1.000 .864 
CoopMgt .099 .077 .256 .661 .423 .864 1.000 
 
The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis. 
 
Table 5 – 3: Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item  
Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item  
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Fnancial 12.18 11.858 .484 .648 .813 
Physcal 12.00 12.138 .466 .664 .815 
Skills 12.05 11.374 .631 .643 .788 
Mgt 11.62 11.653 .517 .591 .807 
Training 11.86 11.073 .687 .620 .778 
DecsnMkg 11.77 11.378 .616 .807 .790 
CoopMgt 11.69 11.724 .563 .753 .799 
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The Cronbach’s alpha for both the co-operative environment variables and the internal 
environment variables is greater than .8. Since the values of Cronbach’s alpha between 
.7 and .8 indicate good reliability (Field, 2005; Moser and Kalton, 1989; Bryman and 
Cramer, 2005), it is reasonable to assert that the questionnaire used in this study is 
reliable. 
 
4. Findings and Conclusions 
 
The study sought to investigate the causal link between the job ownership structure and 
increased commitment and motivation in worker co-operatives. It first examined the 
extent to which members commitment and members participation helped in fostering 
the achievement of the worker co-operatives’ objectives. As shown in table 6 below, 
members’ commitment and participation were considered by the respondents as major 
strengths in achieving the organizations objectives. Since worker co-operatives are 
social capital based organizations, they draw their strengths from the multi-
dimensional relationships with their members, commitment from the members and the 
direct participation by the members in both the benefits and the governance of the 
enterprise. 
 
Table 6: Members commitment, participation and performance 
 Major Strength 
(%) 
Minor Strength 
(%) 
Not Strength 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Members Commitment 61.1 22.1 16.8 100 
Members Participation 57.3 25.2 17.6 100 
 
A test was formulated to assess the association between the worker co-operatives’ level 
of performance satisfaction and the extent of the members’ commitment. Spearman’s 
rank correlation, Chi-square and Cramer’s V measures were used to test the association 
between the worker co-operatives’ level of satisfaction and the extent of the members 
commitment. Table 7 below shows the outcome. 
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Table 7: Members Commitment and Performance Satisfaction 
Table 7a: MbCommit * Satisfd Crosstabulation 
 
Satisfd 
Total 
 
satisfd Somewhat 
Not 
 
MbCommit 
     
MjrStrth 30 41 8 79 
   
MnrStrth 
12 9 5 26 
   
NotStrth 
9 3 14 26 
 
Total 51 53 27 131 
 
Table 7b: Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.813(a) 4 .000 .000 
  
Likelihood Ratio 25.388 4 .000 .000 
  
Fisher's Exact Test 24.590   
 
.000 
  
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.319(b) 1 .012 .013 .007 .003 
N of Valid Cases 
131           
 
Table 7c: Symmetric Measures 
  Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Exact 
Sig. 
Nominal by 
Nominal 
Phi .452 
  
.000 .000 
   
Cramer's V 
.320 
  
.000 .000 
   
Contingency 
Coefficient 
.412 
  
.000 .000 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R 
.220 .095 2.567 .011(c) .013 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.169 .097 1.952 .053(c) .053 
N of Valid Cases 131 
    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
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 Although Spearman’s rho has an exact significance of .053 which is greater than 
the .05 level, the other four measures (Chi-square, Cramer’s V, Phi, and Contingency 
coefficient) have a significance level of less than .05. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that there is a positive association between the worker co-operatives’ level of 
satisfaction with performance and the level of the members commitment (Spearman’s 
rho = .169, p = .053; Chi-square = 26.813, p < .05; Cramer’s V = .320, p < .05). Phi 
coefficient and Contingency coefficient measures also support this conclusion (Phi = 
.452, p < .05 and Contingency coefficient = .412, p < .05).  
 It has been argued (Postlethwaite et al, 2005; Michie et al, 2002) that employee 
owned organizations have the ability to harness the true commitment and creativity of 
their employees. Employees’ involvement and participation do increase commitment 
and motivation whereas the increased commitment and motivation in turn result in 
improved performance. 
 One of the worker co-operatives which attribute its excellent performance to the 
members’ commitment and participation is the Tower Colliery of South Wales in 
Britain. This co-operative was formed by the workers who opted for an employee 
buyout of the Tower colliery after it was closed by the British Coal in April 1994. Tower 
Employment Buyout team (TEBO), a group selected by the workers successfully 
negotiated for the purchase of the mine which re-opened in 1995 as a worker co-
operative. By 2005, the worker co-operative had nearly doubled its output that rose 
from 380,000 tonnes to about 650,000 tonnes. The turnover had also risen to about £26 
million. The number of employees also increased from about 237 to 400 workers. ‚The 
co-operative model of business, with its participative and democratic governance practices was 
credited for this success‛, said an official of the worker co-operative.  
 A leader of another worker co-operative with satisfactory performance, SUMA 
wholefoods, in West Yorkshire, was also interviewed. The enterprise is a wholesaler 
and distributor of fair trade, organic and vegetarian foods whose turnover is about 
£21million. It has 120 employees. SUMA was started by one man in 1974 in Leeds and 
was converted and registered as a worker co-operative in 1977. A SUMA official 
(insisted to be referred to simply as worker) interviewed for this study believes that 
SUMA has ‚grown consistently for thirty years in a fiercely competitive market by providing 
better service to the customers and better jobs to the workers‛.  
 According to the official interviewed, there is no ‚boss‛ at SUMA because 
management decisions are taken as far as possible by democratic consensus. The 
General Meeting of all the members is held six times in a year and decides on business 
                                                          
 Information received at the time of this thesis submission is that Tower Colliery has closed down due to 
the depletion of coal deposits in their mines. 
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strategies, plans, and major policy decisions. A Management Committee of six people 
(with two places reserved for women) is elected by the General Meeting to implement 
its policies and decisions. The Management Committee then appoints the co-operative’s 
executive officers who attend the management committee meetings on advisory 
capacity. ‚The power therefore rests with the elected representatives (directors) and not with the 
executives‛ concluded the official (worker).    
 Members’ loyalty and commitment has also been given by a co-operative official 
as the main strength behind the success of Savant Enterprises Worker Co-operative. 
Savant was formed in 2001 in Carnforth, Lancashire to deal in software development 
and information technology consultancy. According to the co-operative’s official, 
software development requires a great deal of team work and is a people-based 
business. He added that job-ownership model fosters this team culture and ensures that 
employees get recognition for their efforts. As a result of members’ loyalty and 
commitment, staff turnover at Savant is very low. This results in a strong software 
development team whose skills and experience are continually growing. According to 
the co-operative official, the current structure and ownership at Savant is a two-way 
street. The co-operative gains commitment from the staff and encourage their 
involvement, while at the same time, the staff gain satisfaction and reward for their 
efforts. Savant counts excellent communication, employee empowerment and 
unparalleled commitment as the secret behind their success.  
 To establish whether the co-operative environmental factors correlate maximally 
with the level of performance satisfaction in the worker co-operatives, a multiple 
regression model was used in which all the co-operative environmental factors were 
utilized as predictors. The resultant regression analysis is shown in table 8 below. 
 
Table 8: Regression Analysis – Co-operative Environmental Factors 
Table 8a: Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .598(a) .358 .310 .625 .358 7.500 9 121 .000 
a Predictors: (Constant), Alliance, Collbrtn, MbEductn, ComOwner, Commnity, MbCommit, Princpls, 
FairTrde, MbPtcptn 
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Table 8b: ANOVA(b) 
Model   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 26.357 9 2.929 7.500 .000(a) 
  Residual 47.246 121 .390 
  
  Total 73.603 130 
   
a Predictors: (Constant), Alliance, Collbrtn, MbEductn, ComOwner, Commnity, MbCommit, Princpls, 
FairTrde, MbPtcptn 
b Dependent Variable: Satisfd 
 
Table 8c: Coefficients(a) 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
    B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
  
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 Constant .667 .372 
 
1.795 .075 
     
  ComOwner .017 .078 .017 .220 .826 .074 .020 .016 .843 1.186 
  Princpls .304 .087 .318 3.503 .001 .490 .303 .255 .642 1.557 
  MbCommit 
-.201 .156 -.205 
-
1.288 
.200 .178 -.116 
-
.094 
.210 4.755 
  MbPtcptn .209 .159 .215 1.314 .191 .258 .119 .096 .199 5.022 
  MbEductn 
-.095 .080 -.093 
-
1.196 
.234 .051 -.108 
-
.087 
.874 1.145 
  Commnity .295 .090 .308 3.273 .001 .483 .285 .238 .601 1.665 
  FairTrde .105 .086 .115 1.229 .222 .386 .111 .089 .608 1.646 
  Collbrtn 
-.030 .079 -.029 -.375 .708 .122 -.034 
-
.027 
.892 1.122 
  Alliance .069 .092 .059 .752 .453 -.049 .068 .055 .858 1.165 
a Dependent Variable: Satisfd 
 
The result shows that R, which is the multiple correlation coefficient between the 
predictors and the outcome is .598 while R2, which is the measure of how much of the 
variability in the outcome is accounted for by the predictors is .358. This means that co-
operative environmental factors account for 35.8% of the variation in the worker co-
operatives’ performance satisfaction.    
 Table 8a and Table 8b give the value of F-ratio as 7.500. They also indicate the 
value of Sig. F Change to be .000. This means that p-value = .000. Since the F-ratio is 
greater than 1 and the p-value < .05, the predictors make a significant contribution to 
predicting the outcome. Since p-value < .05, the F-ratio of 7.500 is significant and is not 
likely to have occurred by chance. Therefore, the co-operative environmental factors do 
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make a significant contribution to predicting the level of performance satisfaction in 
worker co-operatives.  
 Table 8c gives information on the B coefficients and the collinearity statistics. The 
B coefficients show the relationship between performance satisfaction and each 
predictor. Most of the VIF values are below 10 and most of the tolerance statistics values 
are above .2. However, the VIF values for members’ commitment and for members’ 
participation are significantly high. The collinearity statistics for members’ commitment 
and for members’ participation are, on the other hand, significantly low. This suggests 
that there could be collinearity within the data used and that there could be strong 
correlation between members’ commitment and members’ participation in the regression 
model used. 
 From the literature review, many writers (Postlethwaite et al, 2005; Michie et al, 
2002) contend that employee owned organizations have the ability to harness the true 
commitment and creativity of their employees. It has also been argued that employees’ 
involvement and participation do increase commitment which in turn results in 
increased productivity. In order to establish whether the factors related to employee-
ownership correlate maximally with the level of performance satisfaction in the worker 
co-operatives, a regression analysis was carried out in which the factors related to 
employee-ownership were used as predictors. The outcome is shown in Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9: Regression Analysis – Factors Related to Employee Ownership 
 
Table 9a: Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .352(a) .124 .059 .730 .124 1.905 9 121 .057 
a Predictors: (Constant), ExtnFund, WorkSati, EmpDiscp, EmplRela, DecsnMkg, InfoShar, StaffRec, 
EmplComt, EmplProd 
 
Table 9b: ANOVA(b) 
Model 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.133 9 1.015 1.905 .057(a) 
  Residual 64.470 121 .533 
  
  Total 73.603 130 
   
a Predictors: (Constant), ExtnFund, WorkSati, EmpDiscp, EmplRela, DecsnMkg, InfoShar, StaffRec, 
EmplComt, EmplProd 
b Dependent Variable: Satisfd 
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Table 9c: Coefficients(a) 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
    B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
  
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 Constant 2.407 .362 
 
6.641 .000 
     
  EmplProd 
-.073 .138 -.066 -.526 .600 .054 -.048 
-
.045 
.463 2.159 
  EmplComt 
-.121 .144 -.099 -.842 .401 .049 -.076 
-
.072 
.528 1.893 
  WorkSati .331 .131 .291 2.534 .013 .221 .224 .216 .547 1.827 
  EmplRela 
-.135 .104 -.113 
-
1.297 
.197 -.115 -.117 
-
.110 
.957 1.045 
  InfoShar 
-.148 .094 -.147 
-
1.582 
.116 -.207 -.142 
-
.135 
.843 1.186 
  DecsnMkg 
-.073 .084 -.077 -.867 .388 -.164 -.079 
-
.074 
.909 1.100 
  EmpDiscp 
-.043 .107 -.036 -.404 .687 -.082 -.037 
-
.034 
.913 1.096 
  StaffRec 
-.002 .086 -.002 -.026 .979 -.070 -.002 
-
.002 
.787 1.271 
  ExtnFund 
-.069 .086 -.076 -.801 .425 -.117 -.073 
-
.068 
.801 1.249 
a Dependent Variable: Satisfd 
 
Table 9 shows that R, which is the multiple correlation coefficient between the 
predictors and the outcome is .352 while R2, which is the measure of how much of the 
variability in the outcome is accounted for by the predictors is .124. This means that the 
factors related to employee-ownership account for 12.4% of the variation in the worker 
co-operatives’ performance satisfaction.    
 Table 9c gives information on the B coefficients and the collinearity statistics. The 
B coefficients show the relationship between performance satisfaction and each 
predictor. It is also noted that the VIF values are all below 10 and the tolerance statistics 
values are all above .2. It can be concluded therefore that there is no collinearity within 
the data used and therefore there is no strong correlation between two or more 
predictors in the regression model used.  
 It has been shown (table 6) that successful worker co-operatives consider 
members’ loyalty and members’ commitment as the main secrets behind their 
satisfactory performance. Savant Enterprises in Lancashire, a software development 
worker co-operative, is very competitive in a technology-intensive sector due to the 
loyalty and commitment of its 32 member-workers. An official of the worker co-
operative attributed their success to excellent communication, employee empowerment 
and unparalleled commitment from their members. Other successful worker co-
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operatives also emphasize commitment and greater participation from all the member-
workers. They involve their member-workers at all the levels of risk-taking, 
management, operations and added-value distribution. Members keep their 
commitments and reliably perform their duties if the worker co-operatives are made 
transparent by good communications and by structures and operations that members 
can see as designed around their own needs. Cohen and Prusak (2001) point out that 
transparency breeds trust and trust lowers contract, monitoring, and agency costs, effec-
tively reducing the barriers between a worker co-operative and its members.  
 Stiglitz (2002) has pointed out that participation leads to commitment and 
commitment, in turn, leads to greater effort from workers. Worker co-operatives like 
Savant Enterprises have performed well because of the existence of both personal and 
collective incentive for greater effort. Since the workers own their own enterprise, they 
share directly in the success and the failure of the firm. This produces a strong personal 
incentive to be productive. It also leads to peer pressures on colleagues to do their part. 
The result is low labour turnover, low absenteeism and reduction in the need for 
supervision when compared to investor-owned firms. De-Miguel, Pindado and De-La-
Torre (2004) concur that the value of an enterprise actually increases with insider 
ownership due to the convergence of interest between control and ownership. Members 
of worker co-operatives are brought together by common interests, experiences, goals, 
or tasks that imply regular communication and bonds characterized by some degree of 
trust and altruism.  
 The level of loyalty and commitment from the worker co-operative members will 
depend on the level of transparency that exists within the enterprise. Successful worker 
co-operatives in Britain, like Suma, Savant, and Tower colliery, have achieved 
meaningful transparency by educating and regularly informing their members about 
their co-operative’s business, products and services, and financial results. A research 
study by Michie, et al (2002) which surveyed 53 employees of worker co-operatives also 
concluded that employee involvement and participation does increase employee 
commitment and motivation and that increased commitment and motivation results in 
increased productivity.  
 Another key finding in this study is the notion that a non-hierarchical 
management structure works for the worker co-operatives. The success of SUMA and 
the success of the other worker co-operatives described above (Tower Colliery, Unicorn, 
Savant, etc) confirm strongly that a non-hierarchical management structure based on 
the principles of democratic control actually works. It has been stated there is no ‚boss‛ 
at SUMA because management decisions are taken as far as possible by democratic 
consensus. Since the members collectively develop the policies that determine their 
worker co- operative's daily and long-term operation, trust, better communication and 
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co-operation become an integral part of the worker co-operative. These virtues are vital 
to the success of any worker co-operative. 
 The study also established that many worker co-operative members lack 
business management skills in the areas of decision-making, internal grievance 
procedures, marketing techniques and many other managerial techniques. The boards 
of directors / management committees are, in such cases, allowed the authority and 
responsibility for the day-to-day operations and decision making. However, in order to 
cultivate the members’ trust, commitment, creativity and innovation, members are 
encouraged to proactively express their views on how the business ought to be run for 
their own benefit and they are also kept informed about what is happening within their 
business. Members are made to feel that their participation is welcome and that their 
views are respected.  
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